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[1525] 
Symposium: Federal Sentencing Reform  
Ten Years After United States v. Booker 
Introduction  
Rory K. Little* 
 
Senior District Judge Charles R. Breyer began his career, upon 
graduation from the law school across the Bay, by clerking for U.S. 
District Chief Judge Oliver Carter. He was then an Assistant District 
Attorney in San Francisco for about six years. Subsequently, and he can 
tell you the story if you’d like to hear it, he got a phone call asking him to 
join some obscure group that was just being formed in Washington D.C., 
called something like the Watergate Special Prosecutors Task Force. He 
took that opportunity, having been advised by local mentors, “Don’t go 
there, that’s a dead end.” It was quite a good experience for him. 
Later Judge Breyer returned to San Francisco to enter private 
practice and specialize as a white-collar criminal defense attorney, 
ultimately becoming a named partner in the firm of Coblentz, Cahen, 
McCabe & Breyer. He also served as the First Assistant District Attorney 
to District Attorney Joe Frietas. Finally, he was appointed to the district 
court in 1997 by President Clinton and has served since that time.   
In addition to overseeing the normal district court docket, Judge 
Breyer has served as a judge on the judicial conference’s Multidistrict 
Litigation Panel. He has served on influential other advisory groups, 
including some international legal advisory groups. And he currently 
serves as Vice Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. So he is 
particularly well positioned to talk to us about our topic today: federal 
sentencing reform. I have had the pleasure of introducing Judge Breyer a 
few other times, because for six or seven years he has taught federal 
criminal law here at Hastings with me. Sadly, the President stole him and 
put him on the Sentencing Commission, so we have lost him—temporarily 
at least—as an adjunct professor here.  
Judge Breyer has had many prominent cases as district judge, a 
number of which have gone to the Supreme Court. This is either a good or 
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a bad thing, depending on how you count the votes, because his brother 
generally recuses when the case has come from Judge Breyer. Judge 
Breyer also did a lot of theater when he was in college; I think you will 
see the evidence of that. And something else that I think is true about 
District Judge Chuck Breyer, whether he would agree or not, is that he 
could have been on the Ninth Circuit any day that he wanted to. His 
political connections were strong enough. The politics were right. 
Nevertheless, he has always decided to stay on the district court because 
that is where the action is, that is where the law is made, and that is 
where the real litigation happens. I think that good judgment is reflective 
of his character. And I am personally very pleased that he has stayed on 
the district court in this district.  
Without further ado, please welcome one of the most prominent 
U.S. District Judges in the United States, Chuck Breyer. 
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Keynote Address: Federal Sentencing Reform 
Ten Years After United States v. Booker 
University of California  
Hastings College of the Law, February 13, 2015 
Hon. Charles R. Breyer* 
Thank you very much, Rory. That was a generous introduction. I 
think there are two things I would say about it. First, you will see evidence 
in the next half hour of why I did not become an actor. Second, Rory has 
the task this afternoon of moderating a panel of district court judges; I 
cannot imagine a harder task than that.  
I want to address a question that has been discussed this morning 
and will be discussed again this afternoon. It is the question of whether the 
Sentencing Guidelines are relevant today, under an advisory system—the 
so-called post-Booker1 era. It will not come as a surprise to you that I 
believe that they are extremely relevant and vitally important to sentencing 
judges today. In order to test that belief, I suggest that you look at 
sentencing before the guidelines were enacted.   
As Professor Little remarked, I had the privilege of co-teaching 
Federal Criminal Law at Hastings for a number of years. It was my 
assignment to give the lecture on sentencing. I started my lecture with a 
hypothetical. Giving the students a piece of paper, I would say: 
You are now a federal district court judge in 1984, and you have before 
you a defendant. Let me tell you about his conviction. He is an armed 
bank robber who took $20,000 from the bank, and he has one prior 
felony conviction. So please tell me what sentence, in number of 
months, you would impose. 
I would tell them not to look at each other’s paper, that I was 
seeking their individual opinion as the district court judge. I would assure 
them that they were not going to be appealed. They would write down 
their sentence. Then I would add several facts, like that the defendant 
pled guilty. And still more, like that the defendant informed on his 
co-defendants and rendered substantial assistance to the prosecution. I 
added, too, that the defendant served as the lookout in this case; he 
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 1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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didn’t actually go into the bank. I asked the students if these facts would 
change their sentence. Then I would add that the defendant is a drug 
addict, came from an impoverished background, and has been given no 
advantages in life—no decent education, no stable family life, no viable 
employment opportunities. And I asked whether, and if so how, that 
changed their sentences. Finally, I would say, “Here’s another fact—he 
stole not out of greed. He did it only because he needed to support his 
family.”  
I then tabulated the results. And do you know what the range in 
sentencing was? It was everything from probation to ten years. Some of 
these added facts had an impact, and some did not. One student would 
reason, “A snitch? Someone who cooperates with the government? I’m 
not going to give him credit for that. You don’t want a system like that.” 
Another would argue, “A snitch? Of course he should receive a lighter 
sentence. How are you going to prosecute cases without someone who is 
willing to inform on what happened? It makes a big difference in my 
sentencing calculation.” 
One student would question why the defendant would plead guilty: 
“We have a system where people can go to trial, so why should they be 
encouraged to plead guilty?” Another would observe that guilty pleas 
serve the interests of the court: “You can’t try every single case. There 
are 85,000 cases a year—how are you going to have 85,000 trials? There 
are only 960 federal judges.”  
There was great divergence of opinion among thirty Hastings law 
students as to the appropriate sentence and the appropriate factors to 
consider. There were highly individualized views as to how to sentence 
this individual who went into the bank with a gun, stole $20,000, and had 
one prior felony conviction. 
It is not just Hastings students who have these different opinions. 
Prior to 1984, the federal judiciary had exactly the same divergent views 
and practices as the Hastings students. They were all over the lot. This 
wide disparity caught the attention of two U.S. Senators: Strom Thurmond 
and Ted Kennedy. You could not have two people who differed more in 
their views as to political philosophies, ideologies, and criminal justice. 
Yet they thought, as did the rest of the Senate Judiciary Committee and, 
ultimately, the Senate and House, that there was something inappropriate 
about individuals with the same criminal past receiving very different 
sentences for the same criminal conduct, whether they were from Omaha, 
Nebraska; San Francisco, California; or Ho-Ho-Kus, New Jersey. Those 
different outcomes were unfair because these defendants violated the 
same federal law. Therefore the defendants’ sentences, while they need 
not be identical, should be roughly the same, irrespective of the location of 
their courthouse, provided that their crimes share common relevant 
characteristics. 
H1 - BREYER_11 (HAMILTON)-REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 8/27/2015 9:12 PM 
August 2015]         FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM 1529 
Thus, in 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act,2 and the 
Sentencing Commission was established.3 The Commission was directed 
to do a number of things. First, it was directed to set federal sentencing 
guidelines on a nationwide basis for all federal crimes. That might sound like 
a big task, and it was. The bipartisan Commission, made up of seven 
members, met for a year to address this task. And do you know what 
happened? Nothing! Why? Because the Commissioners constantly argued 
as follows: 
Well, I think bank robbery is a very dangerous crime—yes indeed. But 
is it worse than child pornography? After all, child pornography takes 
young people and victimizes them. If you think that’s bad, what about 
someone who dumps a pollutant into the San Francisco Bay and 
poisons people? Is it terrible? Yes, but what about tax evasion? Just 
think, someone doesn’t pay their taxes, and word gets out that you’re 
not going to be punished for not paying taxes, guess what’s going to 
happen? 
This went on and on. They couldn’t agree as to relative lengths of sentences. 
They did, however, agree on one thing, and it was this: there was a historical 
record as to how judges, over ten years, have sentenced defendants in the 
federal system.  
Making use of the historical record, the Commission embarked on a 
study of 10,000 sentences. From that study, the Commission distilled what 
has become known as “the heartland” for all federal criminal offenses. 
For example, armed bank robbers with a prior felony who take $20,000 
were sentenced, by and large, to a particular range of sentences. Then 
the Commission recognized that the heartland sentence is for the 
ordinary case. But judges not infrequently face cases that are not ordinary, 
that are very different from the heartland of cases. As to those cases, the 
Commission envisioned a system of departures. But the Commission 
decided it would tell judges what is and is not a legitimate departure, so 
that departures would be uniformly applied. The system would also be 
mandatory. That is, judges had to follow this system and had to impose 
sentences within this range, or justify a sentence outside of the heartland.4 
 Of course, several wrenches were thrown into the process. Perhaps 
the major wrench was mandatory minimums. In 1986, Congress came to 
believe that some judges were not sentencing defendants to prison for 
appropriate periods of time given the magnitude of the crime committed, 
especially in the areas of drugs and guns. Congress told judges that they 
 
 2. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).  
 3. See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises 
Upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1988).  
 4. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000). The Supreme Court later severed and excised this provision 
from the statute. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259. 
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have to impose a minimum sentence in these areas.5 Then, of course, 
further problems surfaced. One problem was that the testimonies of 
some defendants were absolutely vital to the prosecution of the case; 
unless they rendered substantial assistance to the government, there 
would be no prosecution. But if the guidelines required judges to 
sentence a cooperating defendant to the mandatory minimum, goodbye 
cooperation. So the Department of Justice told Congress that there 
should be a departure from the mandatory minimums to employ one of 
the most effective law enforcement tools. Thus, a provision for departure 
on this basis was enacted; if a defendant renders substantial assistance, 
then judges do not have to impose the mandatory minimum,6  
notwithstanding the fact that it will result in disparate sentences. 
The second task of the Commission was to gather current statistical 
information on sentencing. Every year, U.S. federal courts sentence 
approximately 85,000 federal defendants. If you visit the office of the 
Sentencing Commission in Washington D.C., you will see a team of 
people coding—breaking down all of the sentences imposed according to 
all of the factors the courts considered important to their determinations. 
The result of this effort has been an enormously useful and detailed 
account of what judges today are doing and have done in the recent past 
in connection with sentencing. This can be analyzed on a nationwide 
basis, on a circuit-wide basis, and on a district-wide basis. 
Now, I know that this symposium today is a symposium about what 
happened after Booker when the mandatory guideline system became an 
“advisory” system. It will be said by some speakers, even me, that it has 
had a significant impact on sentencing. But the change to an advisory 
system has not had as dramatic an impact as you might think. You might 
believe that with an advisory system, judges now give any sentence they 
want. Not so. The Supreme Court post-Booker told district judges that 
they may vary from the guidelines sentence but, in doing so, they must 
give their reasoning for the variance, and they must look at the statute, 
which is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This statute identifies seven factors. And 
courts must use those factors in determining the appropriate sentence, 
and give their reasons for it. So courts may vary, but before they do so, 
they still must set the correct sentencing guideline range.7 Why did the 
Supreme Court say that? Well, I believe that it wanted judges to use the 
Sentencing Guidelines as an anchor. Judges then decide (absent a 
 
 5. E.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
 7. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (“[T]o secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines 
should be the starting point and the initial benchmark. . . . [A]fter giving both parties an opportunity to 
argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the § 
3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party.”).  
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mandatory minimum) whether to go down or up, and they must give their 
reasons for doing so.  
Another important aspect of the Sentencing Reform Act was the 
provision of a process for amending the guidelines. Congress told the 
Commission to look at what judges are doing, and then decide whether it 
is appropriate to change the guideline range, or the factors to be considered 
by a judge, in light of their collective experience. Thus, in each year of its 
operation, the Sentencing Commission meets, sets priorities, and then 
offers amendments to the guidelines, which—with public notice and 
absent congressional action—change the guidelines. Two examples of such 
changes are particularly relevant to our discussion today. 
The first example is drugs. The courts’ experience relating to drug 
use and trafficking in the ongoing war on drugs demonstrated over time 
that the federal sentencing scheme in this area was overly harsh, not 
working, and needed to be reexamined to determine whether guideline 
sentences were accomplishing the statutory purposes of sentencing. The 
Commission focused on the evidence regarding recidivism in this area—
do longer sentences impact recidivism? Fortunately, an earlier reduction 
in drug sentences involving crack cocaine had reduced the disparity 
between crack and powder cocaine, which provided some evidentiary 
insight into the question. A 2010 statutory amendment reduced this 
disparity from 100:1 to 18:1 and made the change potentially retroactive.8 
The Commission recommended, as a matter of policy, that the 
reduction be retroactive, with the proviso that the sentencing judge 
retains discretion over whether to give the benefit of a lower sentence to 
an already-sentenced defendant. With that, judges across the country 
were confronted with the choice of whether to lower a particular 
defendant’s sentence. Some judges did and some did not. Accordingly, 
there were two distinct groups of people: those whose sentences were 
reduced and those whose sentences were not. The Sentencing Commission 
followed both groups to see whether there was a higher rate of recidivism 
among those who served the shorter sentence. The result? There was no 
statistical difference in the rate of recidivism between these two groups.9 
The lowering of a sentence would not necessarily increase the risk of 
recidivism. The two groups were equally likely, statistically, to commit 
another offense, or to be in violation of their supervised release. This 
finding called into question whether the length of sentence necessarily 
protects society from recidivist behavior.  
 
 8. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 9. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 2014 Annual Report A-7 (2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/2014-Annual-Report.pdf.  
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This study became the basis for making retroactive the “Drugs 
Minus Two” amendment enacted by the Sentencing Commission last year.10 
As you may know, the Commission voted unanimously—Democrats and 
Republicans—to make the reduction retroactive at the option of the 
sentencing judge. In its wake, that decision brought about a serious concern 
over the length of all drug sentences, for if there is no real difference in 
the danger to the community whether someone serves sixteen years 
instead of fourteen years, or five years instead of three years, then you 
might have to rethink the role that the length of imprisonment at the 
high end of the guideline range plays in connection with the safety of the 
community. As I said, the Commission unanimously voted for retroactivity. 
Who did that affect? Approximately 46,000 federal inmates who were now 
potentially eligible for a reduction in their sentence.11  
This process encouraged the Commission to embark upon a multi-
year study of recidivism.12 We are right in the middle of that now. We 
want to know the evidentiary answers to the questions that we should have 
asked years ago, such as: What are the factors that contribute to 
recidivism? And what impact does a particular length of sentence have 
on those factors? That will be a very interesting study when it comes out, 
and the Commission has no prejudgment on those issues. Although I 
have been told that factors such as age play some sort of role (this is very 
welcoming to me at age seventy-three—perhaps I have aged out of the 
criminal process; fortunately I have not aged out of the judicial process). 
So one issue is whether you want to treat a person who is seventy-three 
years old differently from how you treat a person who is eighteen or 
twenty-five. Congress originally told the Sentencing Commission that age 
should be a prohibited factor to be considered in sentencing. But doesn’t 
that fly in the face of experience? Moreover, there may be many ways to 
address the fairness issue. Is it unfair to treat two people who commit the 
same crime—one who is twenty-five and one who is seventy-three—
differently in terms of the length of their sentences? It depends on what 
you want to accomplish by the sentence. It is complicated. But you do 
have to know the facts and the evidence before you start to amend the 
guidelines. That is where the gathering of information by the Commission 
aids us in making the guidelines relevant.  
 
 10. Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,973 (Aug. 1, 2014).  
 11. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Unanimously Votes to 
Allow Delayed Retroactive Reduction in Drug Trafficking Sentences 1 (July 18, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/20140718_press_release.pdf. 
See Clemency Project 2014, https://clemencyproject2014.org/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2015) (project 
designed to implement this change with dozens of volunteer lawyers). 
 12. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Selects Policy 
Priorities for 2014–2015 Guidelines Amendment Cycle 2 (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/20140814_Press_Release.pdf.  
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The second example of potential changes to the guidelines is in the 
area of fraud. I have to be somewhat circumspect because the Commission 
has yet to adopt proposed changes to the guidelines.13 A number of the 
proposed changes come from white-collar practitioners who argue that 
the measurements for white-collar offenders in terms of loss, victim 
impact, and other factors do not make sense in the majority of cases. 
It is my personal opinion that their concerns are valid. When we 
received these proposals at the Commission, we did what we do in every 
case. We asked, “What is the evidence? What are the facts? How are judges 
treating white-collar offenders?” The staff looked at years of sentencing 
in white-collar cases. As you may know if you’ve studied the guidelines 
in this area, the driving force—perhaps the principal driving force—is 
loss. The staff found that more than fifty percent of cases sentenced 
under the guidelines involved a loss of $120,000 or less, and eighty-two 
percent involved a loss of $1 million or less.14 Thus, the vast majority of 
cases involving the fraud guidelines deal with relatively small losses.  
Given that the majority of fraud cases fall into these lower 
categories, you might ask what judges do as to sentences in this area. The 
answer was interesting. It appears that the recommended guideline 
sentence and the imposed sentence (that is, what judges actually did) 
move in parallel, closely tracking each other until you reach more than 
$1 million in losses. At that point, the judges vary significantly downward 
from the recommended guideline range. This suggested to the Commission 
that maybe the guidelines at those lower levels were not broken. They 
were consistent with the judges’ practices, until losses exceeded $1 
million. As a result, we proposed amendments to address some other 
concerns such as victim impact, mitigating role, and fraud on the market, 
but did not offer a general rewriting of the guidelines. I am sure we will 
hear from practitioners, from the Department of Justice, and from judges 
as to whether they think that these proposed changes make sense.  
But my point is this: we try in our Commission deliberations not to 
base our decisions just on philosophy, because there might be as many 
different philosophies as there are Commissioners. Nor do we make 
decisions based solely upon our own innate sense of whether they are fair 
or proportional, because each Commissioner has their own sense of what 
is fair or proportional. We base our decisions, in the first instance, on the 
statistical information of what judges are doing. And that process goes back 
 
 13. Two months after this symposium, the Commission voted to adopt changes to the fraud guidelines. 
See News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Adopts Economic Crime 
Amendments (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-
advisories/press-releases/20150409_Press_Release.pdf.  
 14. Quick Facts: Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud Offenses, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Apr. 
2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Theft_ 
Property_Destruction_ Fraud_FY14.pdf.  
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to the very methodology employed in drafting the first set of guidelines in 
1984: consulting the experience of judges. 
Recently, our Commission conducted a survey of all federal district 
court judges and asked, “Do you believe that the advisory guidelines 
structure that we have today best achieves the purposes of punishment?” 
Seventy-seven percent responded in the affirmative.15 That’s a pretty high 
percentage, when you think about it—frequently you can’t get judges to 
agree on anything, as Professor Little will be reminded of later this 
afternoon. So I am not here to tell you that this advisory system works in 
all cases or achieves absolute uniformity; in the final analysis, individual 
judges have to use individual judgments because they are sentencing 
individual defendants. That discretion cannot and should not be taken 
away from them. But it is not true that in an advisory system every judge 
simply should use that judge’s own sense of what appropriate sentences are, 
because when we had that system, federal judges, just like Hastings law 
students, gave wildly disparate sentences to similarly situated defendants. 
That did not promote justice. For these reasons, I think the guidelines are 
highly relevant today, and I would encourage all of my colleagues to treat 
them with seriousness. The Supreme Court has told us to do so. 
Thank you very much. 
 
 
 15. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Results of 2014 Survey of United States District Judges: 
Modification and Revocation of Probation and Supervised Release 30 (2015), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/surveys/ 
20150225_Judges_Survey. pdf.  
